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LIGHT IRA /ES TO ABANDONMENT*
In Productivity , appearing
in the "(ra i
decllr. tar, vhereaa at 1<-
third of .ill rail cd with Immediately and probably
80 percent should go in era in wh
I
o only what they are
best suited to do." By eontr or R. A. Rice of Carnegie-Mellon
.ersity was quoted as stating at a recent seminar at Queen's University,
. . . "it is unbelievable that some economists are actually urging destruction
of railway tracks in the northeastern United States. They've already torn
up some 16,000 miles in the northeast since the 1920s and they want to
2
eliminate another 16,000 miles. It is little wonder that legislators
pay scant attention to university professors.
These two statements exemplify, in extreme form, the hypotheses that
have developed in recent years about the appropriate nature of the railroad
system and the abandonment of railway lines in the United States.
The Two Hypotheses
The Superrailroad Approach . he first, the superrailroad or
Hilton hypothesis, which appears in the work of George Hilton, of
John W. Kneiling, and in modified form, in parts of the Improving
Railroad Productivity report and the D. 0. T. plan for restructuring
4
the northeast railways, sees viability of the railroads to depend upon
*Paper presented at the Western Economic Association meetings, Las Vegas,
June 10, 1974.
Trains , Vol. 34, May, 1974,
2
As reported in the Toronto Globe and Mail , April 20, 1974.
3
Washington: National Commission on P? of
Economic Advisers, 1973.
4
e D. 0. T. repori . a t he
Northeast Region (Washln; tment asportation, 1974).

.vy volume per tull> k f wit ly limited mileage
of main line tr . with unit t -ing container iza-
tion and usi hnolo^v. \'\ built
on sev,
1. .ge cost per ton mile can be reduced
traffic per ton mile rises beyond the level allowing maximum length trains
to operate daily, from perhaps one million ton miles per mile of track
annually to 100 million or so. The D. 0. T. report regards 30 million
ton miles per mile as a minimum for efficient operation.
2. That the quality of service to shippers will improve with the
end of terminal yard switching, a major source of delay and damage. The
improvement, of course, would benefit only those shippers continuing to
have rail service available. Or, with a somewhat reduced scale of concentra-
tion, along the lines of the D. 0. T. restructuring plan, it is assumed that
service will improve as a result of greater concentration of traffic on a
few lines.
3. That positive externalities from rail service are no greater than
those of highway transport; there are no externalities from rail as compared
to highway service.
4. That containerization will permit continued service to other
shippers losing direct rail service as efficient as the existing service.
As noted, this general hypothesis is reflected, in modified form, in
the D. 0. T. plan for restructuring the eastern railroad system. There
are three key elements in the D. 0. T. plan:
a. Elimination of a number of main and secondary main lines, which now
e adequate traffic to justify their continuation by usual standards, In
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order to cor. LI number of heavy :ines.
Elimination of the Toledo, i and • . nd
the Penn Central's Ch - Danville - southern 111
i
e g°°d examples,
b. Eliminat. consideration in determining viability of lines of
then 75 cars per year originating or terminating.
c. Inclusion in the restructured eastern railroad system only of
lines originating or terminating more than a specified number of cars per
year— for example, 734 cars for a 10-mile line, 1,324 for a 20-mile line.
In the calculation, all bridge traffic plus traffic originating or terminating
at points also served by heavier traffic lines, as well as traffic originating
2
or terminating at points offering less than 75 cars a year, are disregarded.
With these proposals, about 25 percent of the railroad network in the
northeast would be abandoned, except for lines subsidized by local or state
governments, as noted below.
The National System Approach . The alternative, presented in caricature
by the Rice statement in the introduction, and more rationally in the
3
Interstate Commerce Commission's re ent critique of the D. 0. T. plan
The D. 0. T. report implied that service would no longer be supplied to
points originating or terminating less than 75 cars a year even if they were
on lines continued in service. D. 0. T. now denies that this was the intent.
Note Interstate Commerce Commission, Evaluation of the Secretary of Trans-
portation's Rail Services Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974)
2
Many of the lines proposed for abandonment have traffic at present
meeting this standard, but only because of traffic of a bridge nature that
can be handled by other lines.
3
Interstate Commerce Commission, Evaluation of the Secretary of
Transportation's Rail Services Report (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1974).
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may be I l'<-
importance o: in t r y—wh K h
t roiii
to
further use of unit t I (no
it argues that introduction oi tl tiould not be accompanied by disintegra-
tion of the present broad coverage network of lines and traditional train
operation.
The railroad network of the country today is still very broad in
coverage. There are some areas that lack rail service: central Nevada,
much of southeast Oregon, the old narrow gauge country of Colorado, parts
of Utah, Montana and Wyoming. But there are relatively few towns of any
size that do not have rail service, and thus most have potential for economic
development of types for which carload rail service offers advantages. Any
small town in Kentucky or Vermont can have a factory that ships its output
of automobile parts to every assembly plant in the United States. Shippers
in all localities having rail service have access to the lower cost of long
distance rail shipments, in extreme contrast to Hilton's ultimate model,
which would limit rail service to a relatively few large communities and to
a few large shippers, plus those able to use the container mode. The
Hilton policy would lead to still further concentration of economic
activity in industries and localities and cause substantial economic loss
to many area--. To take one example: the automobile industry utilizes a
complex and all-encom g network of rail service, involving at the one
. eme unit trains and heavy volume traffic on major lines and at the
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other, shipment of three or I ill I on branch lines serving
supplying pi with t- r which containers, piggy-
back, or other modes involv I ghway use are not feasible.
The national system approach questions the significance of the gains
from concentrating traffic on a smaller number of main lines and is highly
critical of the D. 0. T. plan for the northeast on this basis. This
feature of the D. 0. T. proposal accounts for a large portion of the
proposed abandonments, and particularly those against which there is the strongest
opposition. While our knowledge of cost functions of the railroads is still
limited, the work of Meyer, Healey, and others suggests that cost is reduced, per
ton mile, relatively little as the density of traffic on a line increases beyond a
certain point. The Healey study suggests that the optimum is reached at about
three million ton miles per mile of line—only one-tenth of what the D. 0. T.
reorganization proposals suggest as a desirable main line goal. Admittedly
the Healey data (1954-55) is out of date, but it is hard to believe that the
change has been drastic. Once traffic reaches the level at which one
capacity-operated train can be operated daily, about 1.5 million ton miles
per mile of line annually, the train operation and equipment maintenance
expenses rise roughly in proportion to traffic as more trains are added,
and it is estimated that at least two thirds of the maintenance of way costs
2
at these levels vary directly with traffic. Only a small portion of the
total costs do not vary with volume at this level, and thus the potential
Improving Railroad Productivity
,
op. cit., p. 254.
2
Ibid.
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Llmlt «.-u . K. ldlcated
of rhi lble, would I cct on
age c<
Obviously costs would be still lower if only unit trains were operated,
but the benefits would accrue to only a small number of shippers. Unit
container trains operating between large city terminals, as stressed in
Improving Railroad Productivity
,
would broaden the range of shippers able
to benefit, but would not aid bulk shippers or others for whom containers
are not, at present, suitable.
The D. 0. T. proposal to concentrate main line traffic on a much smaller
number of lines would encounter one inherent diseconomy (unless all trains
were unit trains). The increased congestion in the metropolitan area
terminals would increase costs and delay service. This is the basis of
much of the violent shipper opposition to abandonment of several major
east-west routes in Illinois and Indiana under the D. 0. T. proposal.
The national system approach minimizes the significance of the light
traffic line problem for the failure of the railroad industry to earn an
adequate return. There is substantial evidence of the limited significance.
Studies of the Penn Central financial situation attribute not more than $20
million of the system's overall losses (running over $100 million a year) to the
light traffic lines. An estimate by the Federal Railroad Administration suggests
that the figure for the railroads of the country as a whole is about
I. C. C, Evaluation Report , op. cit., p. 16.
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$57 million. Eve Lnadequate maintenance,
it : 1 a very small railroad's financial pictui
total iea in L973 wore $] . Other elements in the picture
int: an unsatisfactory rate structn
with rates too high on some goods and too low on mass mov of bulk
commodities; the slowness of the I. C. C. to allow rate adjustments;
inflexible labor work rules; and management not fully responsive to
innovations and changing conditions
—
partly in turn due to the effects of
regulation.
In further support of the national system hypothesis is the exter-
nality consideration: the more freight traffic that moves by rail, the
lower the extent of pollution, the drain on energy, the congestion on
highways, and the demand to carve up more farmland and more urban areas
to create more expressways and interstate routes. For the system approach,
the maintenance of a unified system, insuring service to all regions and
communities of any size, is an important national objective in itself, to
insure potential for future development of all areas. The "superrailroad"
enthusiasts minimize or ignore these externalities, seeking to retain
only those rail lines directly profitable in revenue and cost terms.
Finally, the national system concept maintains that light traffic lines,
while even now not a major source of difficulty, can be operated more
cheaply than many now are— that standard operating procedures of the Class I
railroads and the work rules of the labor agreements make costs much higher
on branches of Class I roads than is necessary. A high degree of flexibility
Improving Railroad Productivity
,
op. cit., p. 160
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in u inctl mis and minimization of the i
Lly
.
Some Empirical Evidence
An analysis of costs of Class II railroads, which are typically,
but not exclusively, light traffic lines offers some assistance in
evaluating the branch line issue. From the 297 Class II railroads in 1968
(the last year for which published data are available), a sample of 148
lines was selected; omitted were ones with substantial passenger traffic,
those operated as integral parts of Class I railroad systems, ones for
which full data were not available, ones with obvious nontypical features,
and those under eight miles in length. The under-eight group contains a
number of lines that are primarily switching and terminal roads (though not
technically so classified) and the figures therefore are not comparable.
Cost includes all operating costs, equipment rental, and a calculated
Those with gross revenue under $5 million annually.

m on but not I ea toward
lroads vary widely am ind the Fedrril Lncoae t-ix afl
only roads earning a profit. The figures therefore arc slightly low in
terms. The crude data are plotted on Figure 1. Regression analysis
planned for this paper is still underway, and the results will be available
shortly. In Figure I, the cost per ton mile for each road in the sample is
plotted against the volume of traffic (ton miles per mile of line). The lines
were grouped into five categories by miles operated: 8 to 14; 15 to 24; 25 to 40;
41 to 65; and over 65.
The diagram suggests several conclusions:
1. For each mileage group and for the aggregate, the data show an
inverse relationship between volume of traffic and average cost, as would
be expected, producing the usual declining average cost curve. While cross
section analysis basically shows the long run average cost function, some
short run influences—degree of utilization of existing plant—are inevitably
reflected as well.
2. The decline in average cost is very sharp between 20,000 and
75,000 ton miles per mile of line.
3. Most of the economies are exhausted at the relatively low figure
of 250,000 ton miles per mile of line; the decline beyond this figure is
relatively slight.
4. For the lines with density under 250,000 and especially under
100,000, there is a very high degree of scattering. Some lines with less
than 100,000 ton miles achieve costs per ton mile well under 5 cents.
The Hartford and Slocomb, and the Warren and Ouachita Vali
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both in the south, show particularly low t on light traffic.
The a, with a cost L.4 cent per ton mile with
a voli. only 257,000 ton miles per mile of line shows unusually
low cost for a longer re
5. A group of thl es with volume over one million ton miles,
but in all cases less than 2.5 million, show cost per ton mile less than
for the railroad system of the country as a whole, as noted below:
Ton miles per
Miles mile of line Cost I"=r ton mile
96 1,116 .89
214 2,387 .96
93 1,625 .84
209 2,318 .48
Line
Pittsburgh & Shawmut
Alabama, Tennessee & Northern
Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia
Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf
The salvage value figures used for these lines may be somewhat low, but
no amount of reasonable adjustment would raise the cost per ton mile
significantly.
6. Length of the line, which is obviously correlated, though by no
means perfectly, with the average length of haul is clearly an influence
on cost per ton mile (primarily through the significance of terminal
(switching and train assembly) costs. Bui .nfluence appears to be
less than might be assumed. None of the roads over 40 miles in length
The c ,1 railroads was about 1.4 cents
per to: about 4 million ton miles per mile of line.
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1 1 y J ;e hav>
ove: mt8~but thei ' h.
For the heavi. . Le iniluence,
but the dJ >r the typical lin< iill not great.
The major implications of these results are:
1. Lines with traffic volume under 75,000 ton miles per mile of line
have relatively high costs, compared to those with greater volume; the
majority exceed 10 cents per ton mile. While a few hold costs down
remarkably well, the minimum maintenance costs—about $2,000 per mile
—
severely restrict cost reduction. With 30,000 ton miles per mile,
the maintenance costs alone amount to 6.67 cents per ton mile. Such
lines, however, may be economically justifiable if they are relatively
short
—
perhaps under 50 miles, and particularly under 20 miles—because of
their performance of terminal operations and avoidance of the costs of
transfer of goods from motor carrier to rail.
2. Lines with traffic in excess of 250,000 ton miles per mile of
line with few exceptions show costs below four cents a ton mile and thus,
considering the terminal element role, are clearly economic under most
circumstances
.
3. Lines with traffic in excess of one million ton miles per mile
show costs comparable to the industry average and clearly less than motor
carrier costs.
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4 . T : .' L t h t
•
under 20,000 ton mil. line, or under the minimum criteria oi
the D. 0. T. report tor eligibilit; tor subsi. Uere are only four
independent 1 68 or greati r length with traffic under 20,000
ton miles per mile, and the longest of these is 15 miles. All are in the
eastern region.
Yet the Class I railroads have substantial mileage with traffic
under this figure; a study indicates that 21,000 miles of line of the
2
Class I railroads originates less than 25 cars per mile per year; for a
ten-mile line this provides a density of 12,500 ton miles per mile of
line if the tonnage moves over the entire length. The implication is
that if these branches were transferred to local ownership, as discussed
below, most could not survive without subsidy.
Arcade and Attica, Grafton and Upton, Hoosac Tunnel and Wilmington,
and Louisville, New Albany and Corydon. There are seven lines under
eight miles with less traffic than 20,000 ton miles per mile. The
lowest, the Augusta, has only 4,000 but is only one mile in length.
h mproving Railroad Productivity
,
op. cit., p. 161.
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AbandonmeiU To L icy
Without . *>n the i mileage of marginal and sub-
marginal lines in the Q. S. today, and operation of some of these lines
does r. the overall rate of return and even endangers the continued
operation of certain railroads. If one accepts the superrailroad hypothesis,
the answer is simple: abandon all mileage of a marginal or submarginal
character keeping only obviously profitable lines. The national system
hypothesi? suggests a much more temperate approach, with the presumption
that lines should be retained except when it can be demonstrated that they
are sources of significant loss, have no prospects for the future, and do
not convey offsetting externality benefits.
Under the latter approach as well as under the former, some additional
abandonments are justified. These include several types of lines:
1. Parallel routes, which can be abandoned without loss in service.
Much progress has been made along these lines; one of the two lines down
the Deschutes River canyon in Oregon was long ago abandoned, and the Illinois
Terminal now operates almost entirely on other railroads' trackage. But
there remain some parallel routes.
2. Branches that provide access of competing lines to towns also
served by other railroads. There are a number of lines that serve no
other function; abandonment would not eliminate service from any community,
but merely cause loss of competitive service. If volume is large this may
be justified; if not, it is hard to defend continued operation.
3. Lines lacking traffic potential. Many in this situation in the
past have been abandoned over the years as mines or other resources were
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exhausted. The three lines that once served west central Nevada are
examples, and the Colorado narrow gauge lines, whose gauge differential
prevented them from serving the terminal function and traffic potential
did not warrant rebuilding to standard gauge. There is considerable mileage
remaining
—
perhaps 5 percent of the total— that has no more than 5,000 ton
miles per mile of track annually. These lines could not survive as independent
roads, but their Class I owners do not abandon them
—
partly because of inertia,
partly because of the protest of the communities involved. Under any rational
version of the national system approach, such lines would not normally be
kept, except for potential for future development of the region, if abandon-
ment would leave a substantial region without rail service.
But these lines probably do not constitute a large portion of the total
marginal lines. A substantial mileage lies in the range between the volume
regarded by D. 0. T. as necessary for inclusion in a profitable system,
and a substantially lower figure
—
perhaps 10,000 ton miles per mile of
line. Determination of whether each particular line of this type should
be retained requires benefit-cost rnalysis, taking into consideration not
only the existing and projected future benefits and costs from the line,
but also:
1. The net contribution to the revenues of the national railway
system as a whole, not merely to the system of which the line is a part.
2. Additional amounts shippers would be willing to pay to retain the
line in operation; this In turn reflects the difference between costs of
shipping by rail instead of motor carrier and costs of relocating, and
similar elements.
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3. tslitles: tl y from Lessening highway
congestion, pollution, energy u • , on highways that
would occur rom this figure should be sub-
my ne>, way operation, such as the
cost of grade crossi- '.dents. These are likely to prove to be minor,
however, compared to the negative externalities of additional truck operation
on highways.
4. Cost payments that are in excess of full economic costs. The
principal example is that of property tax payments, other than those that
are essentially user charges for services benefitting the railroad. A
large proportion of property tax money goes to finance education; the nature
of the tax structure is such as to place disproportionate burden on rail-
roads, and this is not a true economic cost.
Community Interests
Apart from these considerations of national nature, retention of a
rail line offers certain benefits to a community over and above the amounts
that local shippers would be willing to pay to retain the rail line. If
the loss of rail service results in the termination of certain forms of
economic activity or prevents new activity from developing, as evidence
suggests does oi ous persons in the community will be injured.
The ability of the local community to develop—commonly regarded as an
objective in itself—will be hampered. Some of the losses are illusory,
but the persons of a community nevertheless feel them to be very real.
These considerati gest that there is justification for subsidy,
from both national and community (including state) governments and from
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shi. ition rtain rail lines that are no; of
ructui But there are
important requiring answers about the sources of funds and the
nature nd the appropriate organizational structure.
The most appropriate sources of funds, by usually accepted standards,
would be as follows:
1. Additional amounts that shippers are willing to pay to keep the
line in operation should be paid by these shippers; to do otherwise is to
subsidize the shippers by the taxpayers as a whole. Subsidy by shipper
is feasible on a voluntary basis if there are only a few shippers, all of
whom agree to the program, but not otherwise.
2. Amounts reflecting estimated community benefits—over and above
those accruing to shippers directly—should be financed by taxpayers of the
particular community.
3. Amounts reflecting externalities of national concern such as the
contribution to the rail network as a whole, or of national scope, such as
more efficient energy use, should b' financed by the Federal government.
This benefit-related program, of course, is subject to modification on
the basis that Federal tax sources are so much more acceptable than local
ones. Accordingly, a much larger portion of the assistance than justified
on a benefit basis may appropriately come from the Federal government.
Blanket rates covering wide areas, characteristic of railroad rate
structures, result in rates to points on branch lines no higher than
to points on main lines closer to the origin.
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Ttw
The: lb8id ization of
marginal. Lln<
1 . 0] m by /.ation by the amount of
the di nd the costs for which the line is responsible.
This involves the least departure from existing organizational structure.
But it is subject to several fundamental objections:
First, all incentive to hold costs down to a minimum and to maintain
high quality of service to attract traffic is destroyed. While there is no
gain to the railroad from deliberately increasing costs, since the subsidy is not
of a cost-plus nature, there is no pressure toward optimal efficiency.
Second, costs of operation are almost certain to be higher than
necessary if traffic volume is well below that allowing nonsubsidized
operation, for reasons indicated below.
Thirdly, determination of the figures of costs that would be avoided
if the line were to be abandoned and of the revenue loss are extremely
difficult to ascertain. If actual calculation were required, constant
dispute between the railroad and the subsidization authority would be
inevitable. As a consequence, the proposal by the Interstate Commerce
Commission under authorization by the Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 pro-
vides for calculation on a formula basis that is highly arbitrary and almost
1
certainly far removed from the desired figures.
Interstate Commerce Commission, Standards for Determining Rail
Service Continuation Subsidies, Ex Parte No. 293 (Sub. no. 2), 1974.
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The formula involves allocation of V« t»ia of ton
miles, train miles, locomotive tu md other el Under the Rail
Reorganization Act, i :eral government will provide 70 percent of the
subsidy, if initiative comes fro;: • or local governments, shippers or
other interested persons, who put up the other 30 percent. Under present
legislation the Federal subsidy will be given for a two-year period only.
Transfer of the line to a local company, owned by the shippers
or by other local interests. This approach has already occurred in several
instances. There are several lines owned by grain elevator companies
2 3
and a number by manufacturing firms or other local shippers, in addition
to the traditional ownership of railroads by lumber and raining companies.
Such lines may be able to continue operation without subsidy, with traffic
less than that necessary for profitable operation by a Class I road. There
are several advantages of this approach:
a. Costs per ton mile can be reduced, primarily by greater flexibility
in the use of labor. Trains can be operated with two-man crews, particularly
if other personnel can assist with nore complicated switching, and the same
persons may perform equipment maintenance as well as other work. A ten-mile
line can operate with as few as seven persons: a train crew of two that also
maintains the equipment; a track maintenance crew of three; a clerk, and a
manager. Flexibility in the use of labor and small crews are possible only
because of the avoidance of the rigidities of traditional union contracts.
Hollis and Eastern; Great Plains, for example.
2
Cadiz; Ferdinand, for examp
3
Hartford and Slocomb, for example.

it unionised, are able to
; . ! appro i
,
.i i t i ni lar ly on
Nortb i ; the .to Class [
roads refl it once crew sizes are reduced on branch
lines, pressure will increase to do so on main lines. With vt-ry small
shipper-owned lines, personnel can be shared between the business of the
shippers and the railroad, since the railroad does not require the full
time of the employees.
Lower cost for local lines should not be exaggerated; on very light
traffic lines three-fourths or more of all costs are maintenance of way
costs, and these are not significantly affected by work rules or practices.

b. The railroad an adapt It :o the wishes of the shippers far
more effectively than can a CI Lfl road. Tl particularly true with
regard to times of switching, frequency of service, and related activities.
c. This approach allows the internalization within the enterprise of
the benefits to the shippers from continuation of the road when the
shippers are the owners. Any deficits can simply be made up by the shippers
—
in the form of failure to receive a return on the investment, or if necessary,
actual payment to meet the deficit. This is particularly important in
periods of depression, when an independent road may have great difficulty
to continue operation without shipper assistance. In recent years a
procedure has been implemented by the Penn Central whereby shippers can
approximate the same result with a Class I railroad, by contracting to meet
any deficit. But this approach is much less attractive than direct owner-
ship because the shippers have no control over service or over costs of
operation.
On the other hand there are certain disadvantages. Some advantages of
specialization of labor are lost. A local line can realize from the
contributions of the traffic to the major road only if it can extract this
amount from the latter through favorable rate divisions. It will pay some
property tax on the line, whereas the branch, under the tax systems of many
states, will add nothing to the total tax bill of a major road.
If a local road cannot cover all costs, it is eligible under the
Rail Reorganization Act for Federal subsidy, in the same fashion as a branch
Symposium on Economic and Public Policy Factors Influencing Light Dens
j
Rail Line Operations (Washington: Department of Transportation, 1973), p. 29.
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I major system, provided the necessary conditions are met. The problems
of cost and revenue allocation are avoided, and with efficient operation
the costs art.' ilnost certain to be lower. But the subsidy (Federal and
local), if covering the entire deficit, »as proposed, inevitably lessens the
pressure to hold costs down and leads the former to allocate costs to the line
that may appropriately be paid by the shippers that own the line. If the subsidy
could be established on the basis of the actual external benefits to the
community and to the economy as a whole, -this problem would be avoided,
but implementation is difficult.
3. Operation by a Local Government Unit. The final alternative is operation
by a local government unit—a city, county, regional authority, or a state.
There is precedent, the best example being the City of Prineville railway
in Oregon which was constructed by and has always been operated directly
by the city government. The Belfast and Moosehead Lake in Maine is owned
by the City of Belfast. The state of Vermont owns the line formerly operated
by the Rutland Railroad but leases it to the Vermont Railway for operation.
The state of New York owns the fonr r Long Island and other lines in the
New York metropolitan area, but primarily for passenger service.
Municipal operation avoids the conflict over the amount
of subsidy between a private firm and government. The governmental
unit has strong incentive to hold down costs in order to minimize the drain
on tax revenues or to maximize the railroad's contribution to governmental
revenues. When the Federal government is providing 70 percent of the
subsidy, as under the 1973 legislation for the northeast for two years, a muni-
cipal line has some incentive to overstate the deficit, although pressure to hold
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costs down is still present since the taxpayers of the city must cover
30 percent of any deficit • Mimic' ml operation avoids the necessity of
paying Federal income tax in years in which a profit is earned—a locally
significant if artificial advantage; in effect the exemption insures a
Federal subsidy in good years to complement ^the direct Federal subsidy in
bad years if the subsidy program is continued. Likewise, a government line
will, in some states, avoid property tax payments and thus receive a built-in
subsidy from the taxpayers of the various local governments involved. A local
government line may be able to obtain the flexibility in the use of personnel
comparable to that of a locally-owned private company—although in some
situations rigid civil service definition of positions may lessen flexibility.
Public ownership always, of course, encounters the danger of patronage—but
this is not a necessary consequence.
Perhaps the primary advantage of municipal operation is that it
internalizes the community benefits, as noted above; the taxpayers, as
the owners, automatically cover any deficits. The appropriate tax depends
on the distribution of benefits. if most of these accrue to one or a few
shippers, there is strong justification for requiring these shippers to
pay, through contractual agreements. But if the benefits are widespread
throughout the community, or if the shippers will pay most of the tax
anyway, or if placing the burden on the shippers may cause them to relocate,
covering the deficit out of general tax revenues is warranted. Unfortunately
The local government might be tempted by the 7 to 3 payoff of
Federal funds to meet additional expenses benefitting persons of the
community.

in most states the only urpose is the property tax,
and if the amount of the subs: substanH.il, property taxpayers may
ist. The inadequacy of local tax sources constitutes a major argument
for Federal and/o- ice for the subsidy.
The Piggv md Container Alternative.
In various recent studies, that by Ann Friedlaender , the Improving
Railroad Productivity study, and in the work of George Hilton, the position
is taken that piggyback and container operation will permit the abandonment
of light traffic mileage without the loss of rail service to the communities
served by them. For some lines this is a possibility; if the traffic consists
of high value manufactured goods, or some types of fresh fruit and/or vegetables,
these solutions may be entirely satisfactory, but they require removal of
restrictions on railroad delivery over the road of the piggyback or container
units. But many of the light traffic lines handle primarily bulk commodities
grain, ore, lumber, fertilizer, gravel, etc. For these products, the heavy
loading permitted by modern cars, particularly the 100 ton hopper cars, is
essential for low cost. Furthermoi 2, as noted, abandonment of a line is a
once-and-for-all proposition; loss of a rail line eliminates permanently
any chance for development of industries that do require carload rail
service. This is, of course, no argument for retaining rail service where
there is no prospect for such activity—but it is an element to be
considered
.
The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation (Washington: Brookings
1969).
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Conclusion
The railroad system of the United States clearly has some excess
mileage, although theeffectsof this excess on railroad costs and failure
to earn an adequate return are greatly exaggerated, in ray estimation, by those
who hold to the "superrailroad only" philosophy. Particularly the gains from
concentrating main line traffic on substantially fewer lines appears in practice
to offer little in the way of lower cost per ton mile; analysis is terms of
excess capacity is misleading. Yet it is this policy of concentrating traffic
that is responsible for much of the proposed abandonment in the D. 0. T.'s
plan for restructuring the railroad system of the northeast.
But clearly there is considerable mileage that has inadequate total
volume to insure that it covers all costs. The Hilton approach would wipe
out this mileage. The national system approach stresses the importance
of maintaining a nationwide network and sanctions outright abandonment
only of mileage that is duplicative in nature or is hopeless from a traffic
standpoint, now and in the future. As much as possible of the rest would
be retained, in such a fashion that- it would not constitute a burden on
the system as a whole. Certainly cross subsidization is objectionable and
self-destructive. Some of the lines can be preserved with more efficient
service by transfer to local shipper ownership, thus internalizing to the
firm and its owners the additional amounts shippers are willing to pay
to keep the line in operation. But this is feasible only if traffic is
reasonable
—
perhaps 20,000 ton miles per mile as a minimum. Gost reductions
with local ownership cannot reduce cost of maintenance substantially,
and unless the line is extremely short, rate divisions that the major
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roads will tolerate will likely not cover the costs. Other lines can be
Justified economically but require subsidy. Each line must be evaluated
on its own merit; no formula can provide perfect results. With private
ownership, operation of a satisfactory subsidy system is difficult at best.
Municipal operation offers the great advantage of internalizing the community
benefits, and facilitates implementation of a state or Federal subsidy
system. Federal assistance can be justified on the basis of national
externalities and the superiority of Federal tax sources.
John F. Due
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